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1In the U.S., local governments regulate private land use within their boundaries mainly
through zoning. Zoning regulates private land use from various aspects, including the pur-
pose of land use or the shape of buildings. These regulations impose additional entry costs
on new businesses by forcing them, for example, to use expensive materials (e.g., brick) for
the exterior of their buildings or to deviate from a prototype building design. Although busi-
ness owners can request rezonings or exceptions, these requests need to go through processes
that could involve city administration, politics and jurisdiction, and often incur considerable
expense.
This paper argues that stringent land use regulation generates a distortion in local busi-
ness markets by discouraging entry and, as a result, lessening competition. Although people
in the legal professions have noticed this anticompetitive e⁄ect of land use regulation1, it has
attracted little attention from economists and few formal analyses have been done.2
The goal of this paper is to assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis using mi-
crodata on midscale Texas chain hotels and land use regulation data collected from local
municipalities. Note that this paper is not intended to be the ￿nal word on land use reg-
ulation. This paper focuses on an anticompetitive e⁄ect of land use regulation and ignores
its other possible bene￿ts and costs. Therefore, the results of this paper are not su¢ cient
per se to make ￿nal judgments on land use regulation. When it generates bene￿ts to soci-
ety through some other channels (e.g., resolves externalities), land use regulation could be
bene￿cial overall, despite the distortion.
Several facts indicate the relevance of this proposed hypothesis to the lodging industry.
First, land use regulation appears to be among the major determinants of cost structure,
and hence entry decisions of hotels. This industry is capital-intensive3 and its primary
capital input is undoubtedly buildings. Therefore, it is natural to expect that regulations
on buildings have a signi￿cant cost impact. If it were not the case, the change of regulation
would rarely a⁄ect the degree of competition and my hypothesis would have little quantitative
importance. Second, competition in this industry is fairly local. Because of the nature of their
product, hotels must locate at the place of consumption. Therefore, they cannot sell their
product without ￿rst having a physical location inside a market. As a result, competitors
1People in the legal profession have argued that whether municipalities are immune from antitrust liability
arising from their local ordinances. See Sullivan (2000) for a summary of these arguments and several
in￿ uential cases.
2One exception is OECD (2008), which coincidentally has a title similar to that of this paper. This report
documents several channels through which land use regulation a⁄ects competiton and several examples taken
from its member countries.
3According to an example shown in Powers (1992), the capital cost of a typical 120-room hotel accounts
for about 20 percent of its total expenditure. This ratio is about twice as much as that of a suburban
restaurant.
2are limited to other hotels in the neighborhood and entry decisions of local rivals are among
the primary determinants of their market power. If competition were nationwide, entry
decisions of local rivals would have little impacts on the intensity of competition, and again,
my hypothesis would have little empirical relevance. Third, it appears that people in the
lodging industry realize that local land use regulation can act as an entry barrier on their
competitors. This is indicated by the following quote:
There￿ s a short answer to why certain hotel developers choose projects encum-
bered with di¢ cult zoning or environmental challenges. It￿ s because once those
hurdles are cleared, they￿ re often left with a hotel with desirable barriers to entry.
(Cruz (2003))
My empirical analysis starts with reduced form regressions to assess any correlation
between the number of midscale hotels belonging to the six largest, midscale hotel chains
and that market￿ s land use regulations. Reduced form regression results are consistent with
the prediction of my hypothesis. I next construct a dynamic entry-exit model for hotel chains
and apply it to the revenue data. To make the estimation computationally feasible, I employ
the two-step method recently developed by Bajari et al. (2007). As a last step, by using the
structural parameter estimates, I simulate the entry-exit decisions of the hotel chains under
three di⁄erent policies and observe the changes in market structure.
One of the major obstacles for empirical studies of land use regulation is its quanti￿cation.
Complicated rules and the prevalence of local discretion in the actual implementation of
these regulations indicate that no single index is a de￿nitive measure. Acknowledging this
di¢ culty, I employ various measures based on the written survey collected and summarized
by Gyourko et al. (2008). Some of these measures are based on institutional features (e.g.,
the presence of particular regulations) while some other measures are based on the results
of actual implementation (e.g., the average time length to obtain a building permit).
Reduced form regressions indicate that markets under stringent land use regulation tend
to have fewer hotels. However, these regressions fail to separately identify the cost impact
of land use regulation from its impact on local travel demand. Land use regulation could
a⁄ect local travel demand by, for example, preserving some view that attracts tourists or
discouraging constructions of commercial buildings that draw business travelers. When
stringent regulation decreases local travel demand overall, this demand-side e⁄ect can solely
generate the observed negative correlation between the stringency of land use regulation
and the number of entries. Therefore, the observed negative correlation does not necessarily
imply that land use regulation increases entry cost of hotels. To avoid this drawback, I need
to pursue structural estimation.
3I consider a dynamic entry-exit model of hotel chains in which they maximize their
expected pro￿ts by choosing the number of hotels they open or close in a local market every
period. The revenue of one hotel in a chain is a function of market-speci￿c revenue shifter,
chain-speci￿c revenue shifter and the number of other hotels present in the same market.
Since a new hotel cannibalizes the revenue of other hotels in the same chain, the marginal
revenue of opening an additional hotel monotonically decreases. The costs hotel chains incur
consist of sunk-entry cost, operating cost and exit cost. While the sunk-entry cost and exit
cost are incurred only at the time of opening and closing, respectively, operating cost is
incurred at every period until the hotel closes down. I assume that a chain￿ s sunk-entry
cost and exit cost are stochastic and their actual sizes are only observable to this chain
only. Therefore hotel chains￿entry and exit decisions are based on their beliefs about their
competitors￿entry-exit decisions. In a Markov Perfect equilibrium, these beliefs must be
consistent with the actual entry-exit decisions of rival chains.
Estimation consists of three stages. I ￿rst estimate the parameters of a hotel-level revenue
function. Exploiting the longitudinal structure of the dataset, I can identify market-speci￿c
revenue shifters that may be attributable to both observable and unobservable time-invariant
factors. Taking these estimates as given, I next recover market-speci￿c cost shifters by ￿nding
a set of parameters that rationalizes both the revenue function estimates and the observed
entry decisions over time. To take into account the interacting entry-exit decisions of compet-
ing hotel chains while maintaining computational burden, I employ the estimation method
developed by Bajari et al. (2007). Finally, from the recovered market-speci￿c cost parameter
estimates and the land use regulation indices, I draw a statistical inference that stringent
land use regulation increases the market-speci￿c cost shifters by running regressions.
The main ￿nding of this paper is the quantitative signi￿cance of the proposed hypothesis.
First, estimation results indicate that imposing stringent regulation increases both operation
costs and sunk-entry costs enough to a⁄ect a hotel chain￿ s decisions about entering a market.
Second, although they are the immediate payers of the increased entry cost, incumbents shift
a part of their cost increase onto consumers by exploiting their market power.
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, this paper is
among the ￿rst to study the impacts of land use regulation on local business markets. The
role of land use regulation has been a main concern of urban economics and numerous
empirical studies have been conducted in the past.4 The focus of these studies is considerably
broad, including land price (McMillen and McDonald (1991b)), land development (Wu and
4For a survey of empirical studies in this area, see Fischel (1989), Pogodzinski and Sass (1991), Evans
(1999) and Quigley (2007). Regional Science and Urban Economics published a special issue featuring studies
of land use regulation. For the summary of these papers, see Cheshire and Sheppard (2004).
4Cho (2007)), density (McConnell et al. (2006)) and housing markets.5 Nonetheless, its
impact on local business has not attracted much attention from economists. A few notable
exceptions such as Kunce et al. (2002), Ridley et al. (2010) and Nishida (2010) rely on
binary data that tell if a particular location is zoned or not. In contrast, this paper uses
several indices that measure the stringency of land use regulation from various aspects.
Second, in relation to the literature on empirical industrial organization, this paper be-
longs to the large literature on ￿rms￿entry decisions that originated from classical papers
such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992).6 Among others, this paper is perhaps
most closely related to Ryan (2009). In his paper, Ryan estimates a dynamic entry-exit
model of cement plants and evaluates the welfare consequences of a change in environmental
regulation in the Portland cement industry. While Ryan relies on the intertemporal di⁄er-
ence of the industrial structure for identi￿cation, this paper attempts to exploit cross-market
di⁄erences in land use regulation by employing indices that directly measure the stringency
of land use regulation in each market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of land use
regulation for the Texas lodging industry. Section 3 summarizes the data used in the em-
pirical analysis while Section 4 presents the results of the reduced form regressions. Section
5 describes the empirical model used for structural estimation. Section 6 explains the esti-
mation method, and Section 7 presents the estimation results. Section 8 demonstrates the
results of counterfactual experiments, and Section 9 concludes.
1 Land Use Regulation for the Texas Lodging Industry
The basis of the current zoning ordinances in the U.S. goes back to 1926 when the U.S.
Department of Commerce drafted the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), which
has become a prototype of state statutes on zoning ordinance.7 The state of Texas adopted
its version of the SZEA in 1927. The Texas statute grants municipalities authority over
the legislation and implementation of zoning. According to the Texas statute, the purpose
of zoning is ￿promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and protect-
ing and preserving places and areas of historical, cultural, or architectural importance and
5A skyrocketing of housing prices in large metropolitan areas in 2000s prompted studies about the
e⁄ects of land use regulation in housing markets. For example, a series of empirical studies by Glaeser
and his coauthors (Glaeser et al. (2005a), Glaeser et al. (2005b), Glaeser and Ward (2009)) claim that a
signi￿cant portion of increasing housing prices is attributable to stringent land use regulation.
6See Berry and Reiss (2007) for a recent survey in this area.
7This section is mainly based on Fischel (1985) for general institutional knowledge of land use regulation
and Nance (2006) for information speci￿c to Texas. Other sources I found helpful include O￿ Flaherty (2005)
and O￿ Sullivan (2000).
5signi￿cance.￿ 8
Implementation of zoning generally involves several departments of a municipal o¢ ce.
Although its process varies from municipality to municipality, its basic structure is similar.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of the administrative process developers need to undergo to
obtain building permits. Developers planning to construct new commercial buildings within
the boundaries of a local government (Fredericksburg, Texas) ￿rst need to speak with city
o¢ cials in several departments in order to discuss possible problems with the building plans.
If the plans do not violate current zoning restrictions, the process is quite simple. For ex-
ample, developers submit their applications to the Planning and Zoning Commission, which
consists of nine members appointed by the mayor. Unless a disagreement is discovered be-
tween the submitted plan and the current zoning ordinance, the commission usually approves
the plan. Once approved, developers submit a blueprint of their construction to the building
department, which ensures the submitted plan meets building codes. Once it is con￿rmed
that the plans comply with building codes, building permits are issued to the developers.
However, if construction plans do not conform with current zoning laws, developers have
three choices. They can (1) request a rezoning, (2) request an exception to current zoning,
called a variance or (3) withdraw their plans. The procedure for rezoning is di⁄erent from
that of a variance. If rezoning requires amending the current zoning laws while issuing a
variance does not. Developers￿requests for rezoning are sent to the Planning and Zoning
Commission. After holding a public hearing, the commission sends its recommendation on
the requested zoning to the City Council. The City Council makes a ￿nal decision after
holding the second public hearing. In contrast, requests for variances are sent to the Zoning
Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which consists of ￿ve regular members and three alternate
members appointed by the City Council. The ZBA makes its decision after holding a public
hearing. Unlike rezoning, decisions of the ZBA are ￿nal and the City Council is not involved
in the process.
2 Data
2.1 Texas Hotel Data
The main data source of this study, Hotel Occupancy Tax Receipts, is provided by the Texas
Comptroller of Public Accounts.9 This quarterly data set provides the sale of every single
hotel in Texas, as well as other hotel speci￿c information including names, street addresses
8Texas Statutes, Local Government Code, Chapter 211.001.
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Figure 1: Implementation of Zoning Ordinance: Fredericksburg, Tex.
7and numbers of rooms. In addition, I recover each hotel￿ s brand a¢ liation, if any, by looking
for particular brand names (e.g., Best Western) in the name of each hotel. To increase the
accuracy of this process, I rely on other sources, such as AAA Tourbook, Directory of Hotel
& Lodging Companies and various hotel directories provided by the hotel chains themselves.
The sample period of this data set is from the ￿rst quarter of 1990 through the last quarter
of 2005. By exploiting the identi￿cation code that is unique and permanent for every hotel, I
construct an unbalanced panel data set. A notable advantage of this data set is the reliability
of its sales data. The original purpose of this data set was to determine the amount of the
hotel occupancy tax to be collected by hotel owners and passed on to the state government.
Because of this nature, misreporting is unlawful and can be considered tax evasion.
2.2 Measurement of Land Use Regulation
This study employs the indices developed by Gyourko et al. (2008) as measures for the
stringency of land use regulation. Based on a written survey collected from 2,649 local
governments in the U.S., Gyourko and his coauthors construct eleven subindices that measure
the stringency of residential land use regulation from various angles. Among these indices, I
use seven subindices that show considerable variations among the counties in my sample.10
For all indices, large values imply stringent regulation. Table 1 shows the list of these indices
and provides a brief description of each index. The precise de￿nitions of these seven indices
are found in Gyourko et al. (2008).11
2.3 Other Data
Demographic data is from the decennial census and the Regional Economics Information
System provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This demographic data includes pop-
ulation, per capita personal income and area. Local business activity data is obtained from
County Business Patterns provided by the Census Bureau. This business data includes the
number of employees and the number of establishments. I also construct dummy variables
for each county￿ s access to the Interstate Highway System along with their access to commer-
cial airports. To do so, I use road maps and websites of commercial airports, respectively.
Construction cost data comes from Means Square Foot Costs provided by RSMeans.
10The subindices not used here due to their little variation between the counties in my sample are (1) a
measure for state level political pressure, (2) a measure for the in￿ uence of state court, (3) the involvement
of the local assembly in the implementation of land use regulation and (4) the presence of supply restriction.
11For some indices, the names used in this paper are slightly di⁄erent from those used in the original paper
for simplicity. These indices are Political Pressure (The Local Political Pressure Index), Zoning Approval
(The Local Zoning Approval Index) and Project Approval (Local Project Approval Index). The names in
parentheses are those used in Gyourko et al. (2008).
8Table 1: Description of Land Use Regulation Indices
Name Description
Political Pressure Summarizes subjective impressions of the in￿ u-
ence of various political groups (council, pressure
groups, citizens). Normalized so that its mean and
its standard deviation become zero and one, re-
spectively.
Zoning Approval The number of local government bodies from
which projects that request zoning change need to
obtain approvals.
Project Approval The number of local government bodies from
which projects that request NO zoning change
need to obtain approvals.
Density Restriction Indicates if local governments have minimum lot
size requirements of one acre or more.
Open Space Indicates if developers have to provide open space
for the public.
Exactions Indicates if developers have to incur the cost of
additional infrastructure attributable to their de-
velopments.
Approval Delay The average number of months for which develop-
ers need to wait to obtain building permits before
starting construction.
Notes: See Gyourko et al. (2008) for the construction of these indices.
9Table 2: Midscale Chain Hotels in Texas
Companies Brands
Best Western Best Western
Cendant Amerihost, Howard Johnson, Ramada
Choice Hotels Clarion, Comfort Inn, Quality Inn, Sleep Inn
Hilton Hotels Hampton Inn
InterContinental Candlewood, Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn Express
La Quinta Baymont Inn, La Quinta Inn
Notes: The number of hotels listed is as of the ￿rst quarter of 2005.
2.4 Market De￿nition
In the rest of this study, I limit my focus to local competition between midscale chain hotels.
To determine midscale brands, I follow a scale constructed by Smith Travel Research, an
independent consulting ￿rm specializing in the lodging industry. Among the hotel chains
owning these brands, I consider the six major chains. Table 2 lists the names of these hotel
chains and their midscale brands in my sample as of the ￿rst quarter of 2005. These seven
chains account for about 90 percent of the number of midscale chain hotels in Texas.
This narrowed focus is bene￿cial since it makes my empirical analysis considerably neat
without losing the essential aspects of local lodging markets. First, as indicated by Mazzeo
(2002), the lodging market is highly segmented by service grades, and competition is stronger
within segments rather than between segments. For example, Expedia.com, an on-line travel
agency, hits 103 options for a one night stay in Austin, Texas. These choices range from a
room in a budget motel for $45 a night to a room in a luxury hotel for $259. High grade hotels
often provide restaurants, room service and ￿tness centers in addition to nicely decorated
rooms. In contrast, low grade hotels, often called ￿no frill￿ hotels, merely provide clean
and safe rooms for a low price. These two types of hotels belong to di⁄erent segments and
do not appear to compete against each other. Second, among the three segments of hotels
(economy, midscale and upscale), the midscale segment is the largest category in terms of
both the number of hotels and the number of rooms. Third, chain hotels have been the
primary players in this industry. In 2005, in Texas, chain hotels account for 37 percent of
the total number of hotels, 63 percent of the total rooms and 75 percent of total sales. The
apparently high ratio of non-chain properties is unlikely to be problematic for my analysis
as these non-chain properties consist of independent hotels, and various businesses that are
10Figure 2: Graphical Representation of Sample Counties (Dark areas)
not conventionally considered hotels.12 Independent hotels are generally considered to be in
the economy segment, and because services of these other businesses are di⁄erent from those
of the midscale hotels, their presence should not be important for the business of midscale
hotels.
For this study, I consider a county as a single local market since more data is available
at the county level, its shape is relatively uniform in Texas and its border has been ￿xed
overtime. Among the 254 counties in Texas, my sample consists of 40 counties that survive
the following three screenings: (1) counties must provide land use regulation indices, (2)
counties must have undergone at least four opens/closures of the midscale chain hotels during
the sample period and (3) counties must not be the ￿ agship counties of the four largest
MSAs.13 Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of these 40 counties.
2.5 Summary Statistics
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of variables that describe the forty markets in my
sample. The median market has seven midscale chain hotels or 573 rooms, and earns about
12Texas statutes (Tax Code, Chapter 156.001) de￿ne a hotel as ￿a building in which members of the
public obtain sleeping accommodations for consideration￿ . Ranches, cabins and campgrounds all satisfy this
de￿nition. Although I remove properties that are obviously not hotels from my sample, there are signi￿cant
number of properties whose actual categories are unclear.
13These counties are Bexar (San Antonio), Dallas (Dallas-Fort Worth), Harris (Houston), Tarrant (Dallas-
Fort Worth) and Travis (Austin).
11more than two million dollars for one quarter. These numbers imply that each hotel has
eighty-two rooms and each of these rooms earns forty-two dollars for a night. Table 3
also shows a considerable size variation between the markets in my sample. In terms of
population, the size of the market at the sample third quartile is more than four times larger
than that of the market at the sample ￿rst quartile. About 80 percent of the markets in
this sample have access to an Interstate Highway and about one third of them have access
to commercial airports.
Descriptive statistics of the land use regulation indices are hard to interpret because of
their lack of units. Instead, I observe the relationship between market size and these indices
by constructing a correlation matrix shown in Table 4.14 First, land use regulation tends to be
more stringent in markets of larger population size. Out of the seven indices this paper uses,
four of them show statistically signi￿cant positive correlation with population. Second, four
out of the ￿ve signi￿cant correlations between these seven subindices are positive, suggesting
that local governments implement each individual policy according to certain underlying
attitudes such as pro-development or pro-environment.
3 Reduced Form Analysis
This section examines an empirical relationship between the stringency of land use regulation
and two endogenous variables, equilibrium quantity and equilibrium prices by running simple
reduced-form regressions. The proxy for the equilibrium quantity is the number of midscale
chain hotels15. The proxy for the equilibrium price is revenue per room.16 The regressors
consist of the land use regulation indices and various controls that characterize local markets.
I use ordered logit for the number of hotels and ordinary least squares (OLS) for the revenue
per room. For both estimations, I employ the robust standard errors to take into account
the possible heteroskedasticity in error terms.
The impact of stringent land use regulation on the equilibrium quantity and equilibrium
price of local lodging markets is not obvious. According to my hypothesis, stringent land use
regulation decreases supply of lodging services by increasing the cost for hotels. However,
its impact on demand is ambiguous. On one hand, stringent regulation could decrease
local travel demand by discouraging some businesses to come, hence decreasing demand
14When counties in my sample contain more than one municipality and land use regulation indices are
available for both municipalities, I use the weighted average of the original indices of these municipalities for
my analysis. City population is used as weights.
15The regression using the total number of rooms as its dependent variable generates similar results.
16Increase in revenue per room does not necessarily mean increase in prices since not only price but also
occupancy rates (the number of rooms sold over the total number of rooms) a⁄ect the revenue per room.
12Table 3: Summary Statistics of Markets in the Sample
Mean Std.Dev. P25 P50 P75
Midscale Hotels
# of Hotels 9.00 6.06 1.00 7.00 13.50
# of Rooms 790.28 628.00 255.00 573.00 1,206.00
Quarterly Sales (in million) 3.13 2.88 .79 2.19 4.93
Indices for Land Use Regulation
Political Pressure 0.10 0.98 -0.73 0.08 0.69
Exactions 0.88 0.29 0.92 1.00 1.00
Open Space 0.43 0.45 0.00 0.31 0.97
Approval Delay 3.20 1.77 1.69 2.94 3.99
Zoning Approval 2.02 0.72 2.00 2.00 2.48
Project Approval 1.15 0.73 0.69 1.11 1.91
Density Restriction 0.27 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.50
Other County Characteristics
Population (in thousand) 200.06 190.50 61.96 118.34 278.02
Area (in sq mi) 869.39 255.03 784.22 903.53 945.31
Per Capita Income (in thousand) 27.97 5.49 24.94 27.60 30.89
# of Establishments (in thousand) 3.87 3.38 1.07 2.96 5.81
Employments (in thousand) 57.49 53.06 14.52 42.29 89.41
MSA Dummy 0.75 0.44 0.50 1.00 1.00
Airport Dummy 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Interstate Highway Dummy 0.78 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00
Construction Price Index 0.78 0.03 0.76 0.78 0.80
Notes: N=40. All data are as of the ￿rst quarter of 2005. Land use regulation
index becomes higher as it becomes more stringent. Hotel data are from Ho-
tel Occupancy Tax Receipts. Land use regulation indices are from Gyoruko et
al. (2008). All other county data are from County Business Patterns, Regional
Economics Information System, PSMeans and road maps. See Section III for
details.
13Table 4: Correlation Matrix between Market Size and Land Use Regulation Indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) ln Population 1.00 . . . . . . .
(2) Political Pressure 0.42￿￿ 1.00 . . . . . .
(3) Exactions -0.10 0.08 1.00 . . . . .
(4) Open Space 0.46￿￿ 0.50￿￿ 0.18 1.00 . . . .
(5) Approval Delay 0.50￿￿ 0.23 0.19 0.34￿￿ 1.00 . . .
(6) Zoning Approval 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.12 -0.20 1.00 . .
(7) Project Approval 0.37￿￿ 0.22 -0.25 0.35￿￿ 0.27￿ -0.26 1.00 .
(8) Density Restriction 0.10 0.02 -0.42￿￿ -0.01 0.14 -0.14 0.21 1.00
Notes: N=40. See Table 2 for the de￿nitions of abbreviations of the land use reg-
ulation indices. Correlation coe¢ cients with ** and * are statistically signi￿cant
at the ￿ve and ten percent level, respectively.
for business travel. On the other hand, stringent land use regulation could increase local
travel demand by preserving a particular local environment (e.g., nice views or clean water)
that is attractive to either leisure travelers or certain industries. Therefore, the standard
supply-demand framework makes the following ambiguous prediction. When stringent land
use regulation increases local travel demand overall, the equilibrium price increases while
the change in equilirbrium quantity is indeterminate. In contrast, when stringent land use
regulation decreases local travel demand overall, the equilibrium quantity decreases while
the change in equilibrium quantity is indeterminate.
Table 5 and 6 report the estimates of these reduced-form functions based on the data as of
the ￿rst quarter of 2005. I estimate these regressions under various speci￿cations to observe
the change of estimates as more indices are added to the regressors. First, the reduced
form functions ￿t both the quantity data and the price data well. The regression results
show that our control variables explain about one third of the variation of the equilibrium
quanatity, and adding land use regulation indices to the regressors increases R2 by about
eight percentage points. In contrast, the same control variables explain less than 27 percent
of the variation observed in the equilibrium prices while adding land use regulation indices
increases R2 by 18 percentage points.
Second, parameter estimates were mostly consistent with my hypothesis. The column (8)
of Table 5 indicate that the paramete for Project Approval is statistically signi￿cant at ten
percent level. Its negative sign indicates that stringent regulation decreases the number of
hotels. Consider an imaginary market whose characteristics are equal to the sample median
14values. My estimates indicate that this market is expected to have 5:9 hotels. When the
above index (i.e., Project Approval) exogenously shifts to the sample ￿rst quartile level, the
expected number of hotels increases to 6:6. In contrast, when these indices exogenously shift
to the sample third quartile level, the corresponding number decreases to 4:8. The column
(8) of Table 6 indicate that parameter estimates for two indices (Open Space and Project
Approval) were statistically signi￿cant at ten percent level and their signs are consistent with
my hypothesis. According to these estimates, loweing these two indices to the ￿rst quartile
level from the median level decreases revenue-per-room by 15 percent while increasing them
to the third quartile level increases it by 35 percent.
The results above suggest some impact of land use regulation on the entry-exit decisions
of the chain hotels and its consequence on equilibrium prices. Nonetheless, these results do
not su¢ ce to verify my hypothesis that stringent land use regulation lessens competition in
local lodging markets by erecting a barrier to entry. These estimates do not tell if these
observed correlations come from either the demand side or the supply side. As discussed
above, these correlations can be the consequence of demand decrease caused by stringent
land use regulation and the supply side might have nothing to do with it. To identify these
two channels separately from the data, I need to rely on a model and estimate its structural
parameters.
4 The Dynamic Entry-Exit Model of Hotel Chains
In this section I construct a dynamic entry-exit model where N hotel chains may operate
multiple hotels in a local market. At the beginning of each period, each chain simultaneously
decides whether it opens a new hotel or closes its existing hotels, if any. Both opening a
new hotel and closing an existing hotel incur some sunk cost while operating existing hotels
incur operation costs. The presence of hotels operated by rival chains a⁄ect chain i￿ s entry
and exit decision through their impacts on the revenue of hotels belonging to chain i.
4.1 State Space
Denote each chain by i 2 f1;::::;Ng and each period by t 2 f1;2;::;1g. Each chain operates
at most seven hotels in a market.17 A common state at period t consists of (i) a vector of the
number of hotels operated by each chain ht = (h1t;h2t;:::;hNt) 2 f0;1;:::;7g
N and (ii) a
vector of market-speci￿c characteristics (e.g., population) xt 2 X ￿ RL. This common state
is observable to both hotel chains and econometricians. Denote this common state variable
17This upper limit is hardly restrictive. During the sample period, only one hotel chain hits this limit.
15Table 5: Ordered Logit Estimates
Dep. Var. = Number of Midscale Hotels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Population -1.960 -2.385 -2.538 -2.887 -2.280 -2.946 -4.434 -4.588
(2.637) (2.856) (3.323) (3.038) (2.994) (3.302) (3.226) (3.247)
# of Establishments 6.701 7.593 7.804 8.044 9.450 10.242 11.647 11.817
(3.253) (3.765) (4.469) (4.071) (5.390) (6.053) (5.670) (5.687)
Political Pressure -0.392 -0.408 -0.567 -0.702 -0.856 -0.738 -0.741
(0.387) (0.445) (0.691) (1.150) (1.308) (2.026) (2.232)
Exactions -0.302 -0.427 1.418 1.493 1.852 1.846
(2.122) (1.947) (0.527) (2.247) (1.325) (1.292)
Open Space 1.019 -2.023 -1.583 -1.687 -1.734
(1.016) (1.091) (0.624) (0.578) (0.543)
Approval Delay -2.592 -2.271 -0.636 -0.658
(1.454) (1.008) (0.719) (1.587)
Zoning Approval 0.989 -2.207 -0.849
(0.461) (1.191) (0.717)




R-squared 0.331 0.336 0.336 0.341 0.370 0.389 0.413 0.414
Notes: N=40. See Table 2 for the meaning of abbreviations for land use regulation
indices. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates and standard errors for
other control variables are suppressed. Other control variables include per capita
income, area, construction price index, rural land prices and dummy variables for
MSA, access to commercial airports and Interstate Highway.
16Table 6: OLS Estimates
Dep. Var. = Log of Revenue Per Room
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Population -0.116 -0.111 -0.143 -0.221 -0.269 -0.262 -0.124 -0.143
(0.451) (0.461) (0.444) (0.402) (0.416) (0.408) (0.427) (0.437)
# of Establishments 0.191 0.175 0.223 0.282 0.295 0.295 0.186 .208
(0.541) (0.562) (0.544) (0.486) (0.503) (0.512) (0.525) (0.539)
Political Pressure 0.014 0.013 -0.036 -0.035 -0.034 -0.051 -0.051
(0.040) (0.041) (0.047) (0.050) (0.051) (0.040) (0.041)
Exactions -0.132 -0.222 -0.228 -0.231 -0.144 -0.182
(0.195) (0.202) (0.199) (0.204) (0.208) (0.234)
Open Space 0.307 0.296 0.298 0.290 0.290
(0.136) (0.151) (0.155) (0.153) (0.156)
Approval Delay 0.071 0.061 -0.036 -0.035
(0.177) (0.172) (0.163) (0.163)
Zoning Approval -0.015 0.036 0.032
(0.094) (0.084) (0.088)




R-squared 0.276 0.277 0.288 0.382 0.387 0.388 0.452 0.455
Notes: N=40. See Table 2 for the meaning of abbreviations for land use regulation
indices. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates and standard errors
for other control variables are suppressed. See Table 4 for the list of the suppressed
control variables.
17by st = (ht;xt) 2 S ￿ f0;1;:::;7g
N ￿ X. In addition to these common state variables,
chain i receives two shocks, one for entry cost ￿1it and one for exit cost ￿2it at the beginning
of every period. These shocks are i.i.d. draws from the Type I extremum value distribution
whose mean is adjusted to be zero. Denote its CDF function by F (￿). While the shape
of the distribution function F (￿) is common and known to all players, realized cost shocks
￿it = (￿1it;￿2it) are private and only observable to chain i. ￿ 2 (0;1) is a discount factor
common to all chains.
4.2 Choice Space
At the beginning of every period, each chain simultaneously chooses the number of hotels it
opens or closes. Let ait denote the change in the number of hotels chain i operates between
period t and t + 1. Positive ait indicates opening a new hotel while negative ait indicates
closing one of its existing hotels. I assume that entry/exit decisions made at period t are
realized in the next period, hence hit+1 = hit + ait holds. I also assume that hotel chains do
not open or close more than one hotels in the same period.18 Since the resulting number of
hotels after this change still has to be an element of f0;1;:::;7g, chain i￿ s choice set is a





f 0; 1 g;
f ￿1; 0; 1 g;
f ￿1; 0 g;
if hit = 0;
if hit 2 f1;2;3;4;5;6g;
if hit = 7:
(1)
4.3 Period Pro￿t
Chain i￿ s expected period pro￿t comes from any remaining of its expected revenue after
subtracting the operating costs of its existing hotels, the sunk entry cost of opening a hotel
and the exit cost of a hotel it closes.
Given the current state (st;￿it) and its entry/exit decision ait 2 Ait (hit), chain i￿ s choice-
speci￿c period pro￿t is written as:
￿i (ait;st;￿it) = ERi (st) ￿ ￿ihit ￿ 1(ait = 1)(e1i ￿ ￿￿1it) ￿ 1(ait = ￿1)(￿￿￿2it); (2)
where ERi (st) represents the expected revenue of chain i from its current operation of hit
18This assumption is not restrictive in practice since hotel chains rarely open or close more than one hotels
in the same quarter. Out of 15,120 data points in my sample, only 17 data points (0.11 percent) experience
this event. In estimation, I treat these data points as if the change were (minus) one rather than (minus)
two.
18hotels, ￿i denotes the cost of operating a hotel for one period, (ei ￿ ￿￿1it) is the sunk entry
cost and (￿￿￿2it) is the exit cost. Here the mean exit cost is assumed to be zero.
Since this period pro￿t function is linear with respect to the structural cost parameters,
I can rewrite this function as
￿i (ait;st;￿it) = ￿(ait;st;￿it)
0 ￿i; (3)
where
￿(ait;st;￿it) = [ERi (st);￿hit;￿1(ait > 0);1(ait > 0)v1it;1(ait < 0)v2it];
￿i = [1;￿i;e1i;￿;￿]:
4.4 Transition of State Variables
I assume that the evolution of market-speci￿c characteristics xt is a Markov process. I
assume that xt is exogenous. Let P (s0js;a) : S ￿S ￿A ! [0;1] denote the evolution of the
common state variables s where A = f￿1;0;1g
N.
4.5 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
I assume that chain i￿ s entry decision is characterized by a Markov strategy ￿i (s;￿i) :
S ￿ R ! A. When all chains follow their own Markov strategies, chain i￿ s discounted sum
of expected pro￿ts at time t is











= Wi (s;￿)￿i: (5)
where
￿ (s;￿) = f￿1 (s;￿);:::;￿N (s;￿)g;
￿￿i (s;￿) = ￿ (s;￿)nf￿i (s;￿)g











In a Markov perfect equilibrium, every chain￿ s equilibrium strategy must be the best response
to its rivals￿equilibrium strategy. Formally speaking, a Markov perfect equilibrium of this

















for all i, s 2 S and ￿
0
i: (6)























I estimate the structural parameters of the model presented in the previous section by em-
ploying the estimation method proposed by Bajari et al. (2007). Estimation consists of three
stages. In the ￿rst stage, I separately estimate hotel-level revenue functions, hotel chains￿
reduced-form policy functions and transition functions. In the second stage, I ￿nd the set
of structural cost parameters that most rationalizes the observed policy given the environ-
ment speci￿ed by the transition functions and the hotel-level revenue function. In the third
stage, I infer the relationship between the recovered market-speci￿c cost parameters and the
stringency of land use regulation by running regressions.
5.1 First Stage
5.1.1 Hotel-level Revenue Function
I assume that the hotel-level revenue function of the kth hotel belonging to chain i at period
t is given by
lnrikt (st) = ￿i + ￿1 + x
0
t￿2 ￿ ￿3 ln(￿jhjt) ￿ ￿4 lnhit + ￿ikt; (8)
where rikt is a hotel-level revenue, ￿i is a chain dummy, ￿1 is a market dummy and ￿ikt is an
i.i.d. draw from the normal distribution. I also include the quarter-speci￿c dummies while
I omit them from (8) for the sake of the simplicity of the equation. The fourth and ￿fth
regressors represent the revenue impacts of the presence of other hotels in the same market.
The fourth term uses the total number of midscale chain hotels in this local market while the
￿fth term only uses the number of hotels that belong to chain i. The fourth term represents
the intensity of local competition in this market while the ￿fth term attempts to capture
the possible higher substitution between hotels belonging to the same chain. I estimate this
function by using OLS.
20The identi￿cation of the paramereters of (8) relies on the assumption that unobservable
factors consist of the following four parts: (i) time-invariant market-speci￿c characteristics,
(ii) time-invariant chain-speci￿c characteristics, (iii) quarter-speci￿c shocks and (iv) unex-
pected idiosyncratic shocks. Time trend does not appear here since state-wide sales in xt
caputres the time trend. The dummy variables inserted in (8) deal with the ￿rst three factors
while the error term ￿ikt takes care of the last one. The timing of this dynamic game does
not allow unexpected idiosyncratic shocks, ￿ikt to a⁄ect hit.
5.1.2 Policy Function
I approximate hotel chains￿entry/exit policies by a variant of the multinomial logit model.
Let￿ s ￿(ai;s) represent the deterministic part of chain i￿ s choice-speci￿c value function
















Under this notation, I can represent chain i￿ s decision problem as
max(￿i (1;s) + vi1; ￿i (0;s); ￿i (￿1;s) + vi2). (10)
Although the distributions of vi1 and vi2 are assumed to be the Type I extereme value distri-
bution, the choice probability of the conventional multinomial logit model is not applicable
here since hotel chains￿payo⁄ is not subject to any cost shock when they neither open nor
close a hotel (i.e., ai = 0). Hence I derive the choice probabilities that directly captures this
particular feature:




Pr(ai = ￿1js) = 0
Pr(ai = 0js) = exp
￿
￿e￿(1;s)￿￿(0;s)￿








Pr(ai = ￿1js) = 1
1+exp(￿(1;s)￿￿(￿1;s)) (1 ￿ Ui (s))
Pr(ai = 0js) = Ui (s)
Pr(ai = 1js) =
exp(￿(1;s)￿￿(￿1;s))
1+exp(￿(1;s)￿￿(￿1;s)) (1 ￿ Ui (s))
(12)
21where












Pr(ai = ￿1js) = 1 ￿ exp
￿
￿e￿(￿1;s)￿￿(0;s)￿
Pr(ai = 0js) = exp
￿
￿e￿(￿1;s)￿￿(0;s)￿
Pr(ai = 1js) = 0
(13)
Appendix A shows the derivation of these formulas. I estimate the parameters of each
hotel chains￿policy function by approximating ￿(1;s) ￿ ￿(￿1;s) and ￿(0;s) ￿ ￿(￿1;s)
as a linear function of state variables including market ￿xed e⁄ects. I use the maximum
likelihood for this estimation.
5.2 Transition Function
I include the following three variables: (i) population, (ii) the number of establishments and
(iii) state-level sales of midscale hotels into x. I estimate their transition functions by running
AR1 regressions.
5.3 Second Stage
In the second stage, I ￿nd the set of chain i￿ s structural cost parameters f￿i;eig of each
local market that make the observed policy the most pro￿table choice compared to possible
alternatives.
5.3.1 Forward Simulations
I ￿rst generate many alternative policies that slightly deviate from chain i￿ s observed policy.
Next, by forward simulation, I approximate chain i￿ s discounted sum of expected pro￿ts in
the following two situations: (1) when all chains follow the observed policy; and (2) when
chain i follows one of the alternative policies while its rival chains follow the observed ones.
To be speci￿c, I follow the steps below to implement this idea:
1. Fix a market and a hotel chain i.
2. Generate chain i￿ s NI alternative policies by slightly perturbing the observed policy





k=1 denote a set of such alternative
policies for chain i. For notational convenience, let ￿0
i denote chain i￿ s observed policy.
3. Let n denote the index of the forward simulation. At the beginning of nth simulation,
generate a simulated series of xt for T periods by using the AR1 models obtained in
the ￿rst stage. Denote this series as f~ xn
￿g
T
￿=0. For ~ xn
0, use the corresponding value in
the raw data at the initial sample period.
4. Simulate the entry decisions of all hotel chains for T periods when (i) all chains includ-
ing chain i follow the observed policy ￿0 and (ii) chain i follows the kth alterantive
policy ￿k
i while its rivals follow the observed policy ￿0
￿i.
(a) Calculate chain i￿ s revenue, ~ R
k;n
it , by using the ￿rst stage estimates and a vector







. For ~ hn
0, use the corresponding value
in the raw data at the initial period.
(b) For each chain, generate two i.i.d. random draws from the Type I extereme value
distribution and simulate its entry/exit decision, ~ a
k;n
it based on its corresponding
policy.
(c) Iterate this process for every alternative policy, k 2 f0;1:::;NIg. Note that chain
i follows the observed policy when k = 0.






















































In the actual estimation, I employ the following setting: NI = 800;NS = 10;000;T = 80
and ￿ = :974. Note that the unit of the time period is quarter rather than year. Hence
T = 80 is equivalent to 20 years and ￿ = :974 is equivalent to :9 annual discount rate
5.3.2 Recovering Cost Parameters
Based on the outcome of the forward simulations, I evaluate chain i￿ s relative pro￿tability
of choosing the observed policy ￿0






19I implement this idea as follows. I ￿rst generate NI vectors,
￿
￿1;￿￿￿ ;￿NI￿
of i.i.d. random draws from
the standard normal. The length of ￿k is equal to that of ￿i. Second, pertubate the estimates of the observed
policy function by using ￿
k


































This loss function calculates to what extent an alternative policy brings more pro￿t to chain
i than the observed policy when its rivals follow their own observed policies. If the observed
policy ￿0
i brings more pro￿t than an alternative one ￿k
i for a given ￿, this function gives
zero. In contrast, when the opposite is true, we have (minfgki (￿);0g)
2 = (gki (￿))
2.
Finally I estimate structural cost parameter ￿
￿ by ￿nding the one that minimizes this
loss function subject to nonnegative constraints. Since I assume ￿ is common for all players




￿) = arg min
(￿; ￿; e)2R+
1









where ￿ and e are Nm￿6 matrices of operating costs and sunk entry cost, respectively. I add
a subscript m to g (￿) to emphasize that this function is market-chain-policy speci￿c. One
thing worth mentioning here is that the linearity of the period pro￿t function signi￿cantly
reduces the computational burden of the estimation of this model. Without this linearity
assumption, I would have to conduct forward simulations to evaluate the loss function for
each possible ￿, making estimation practically infeasible.
5.4 Third Stage
The last step aims to infer the impacts of the stringency of land use regulation on market-
speci￿c structural cost parameters (￿m;em). I assume that the logarithm of these market-
speci￿c costs are linear functions of land use regulation indices, hotel chain dummy and other
observable market-speci￿c cost factors.







# of Hotels 0.007 0.022 -0.061 -0.178
(0.036) (0.041) (0.052) (0.062)
# of Hotels under the Same Chain -0.714 -0.998 -0.787 -1.060
(0.089) (0.110) (0.105) (0.123)
Population -0.061 -0.025 -4.016 -0.347
(0.363) (0.430) (2.625) (3.108)
Establishments 0.369 1.044 4.887 3.384
(0.417) (0.491) (2.158) (2.534)
Sales 0.488 1.566 0.827 2.647
(0.406) (0.482) (0.525) (0.638)
Log Likelihood -2324.542 -2280.50
Market Dummy No Yes
Notes: N=15,120. Standard erros are in parentheses. Population, establishments
and sales are in log. Estimates and standard errors for market dummies, chain
dummies and thresholds are suppressed. Likelihood fucnctions explicitly take into





Table 7 shows the estimation results of the policy function speci￿ed in 6.1.2. To see the
empirical importance of unobservable market-speci￿c characteristics, I estimate this function
under two di⁄erent speci￿cations: one with market dummy variables and one without them.
First, the estimation results indicate that hotel chains are less likely to open additional
hotels in markets where they have already operated some. Second, including market dummy
variables into regressors are crucial to properly characterize the policy functions. As shown
in Table 7, these two speci￿cations provide quite di⁄erent conclusions on the extent to
which the presence of incumbents a⁄ect hotel chains￿entry decisions. These results suggest






TOTAL NUMBER OF HOTELS
CASE1: RIVAL CHAINS OPEN HOTELS
Probability of Opening
Probability of Closing






TOTAL NUMBER OF HOTELS
CASE2: BEST WESTERN OPENS HOTELS
Probability of Opening
Probability of Closing
Figure 3: IMPACTS OF THE NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS ON BEST WESTERN￿ S
ENTRY DECISIONS
that observable characteristics (i.e., population and establishments) are not su¢ cient to
characterize the demand size of local markets. Hereafter I use the estimation results of the
model using market dummy variables.
To provide some idea about what these estimates imply, I calcluate the change in Best
Western￿ s predicted entry (i.e., ait = 1) and exit (i.e., ait = ￿1) probabilities in a market20
as the number of hotels in this market increases. I consider the following two cases. In case
one, the number of hotels belonging to other hotel chains increase from ten to ￿fteen while
Best Western operates only one hotel. In case two, the number of hotels operated by Best
Western increases from zero to ￿ve while the number of hotels operated by the other chains
are ￿xed at eleven. In both cases, the total number of hotels increase from eleven to sixteen.
Figure 3 shows the result of this exercise. In case one, Best Western￿ s entry probability
decreases from about ten percent to six percent as rival chains open new hotels while its exit
probability slightly increases from 0:7 percent to one percent. In contrast, refelcting high
substitution between hotels under the same chain, its entry probability decreases from 13
percent to 1:7 percent and its exit probability increases from 0 percent to 20 percent.
20This ￿gure uses the data of Potter county, a part of the Amarillo MSA, in the ￿rst quarter of 2005.
The population of this market is close to the sample median in this period.
266.1.2 Revenue Function
Table 8 shows estimation results of the revenue function speci￿ed in eq (8). I use the OLS
for this estimation. To take into account possible correlations between error terms of hotels
that operate in the same market at the same time, I employ the standard errors robust to
clustering. I estimate this function under two speci￿cations, with and without using market
dummy variables to see the empirical relevance of imposing market-speci￿c dummy variables.
First, my estimation results shows that imposing market-speci￿c dummy variables signif-
icantly changes some of my parameter estimates. In particular, the parameter estimate for
the number of rival hotels (the ￿rst row) changes from -.047 to -.380. These results imply
that ignoring market-speci￿c unobservable factors lead to inconsistent parameter estimates.
For further analysis, I use the parameter estimates based on the speci￿cation using market
dummy variables. Second, my estimation results indicate that the presence of rival hotels
signi￿cantly reduces the revenue of a hotel. In particular, its revenue impact becomes more
severe when the hotel and its rival hotels belong to the same chain. Figure 4 visibly illus-
trates the implication of these results by showing how the revenue of a hotel decreases as it
faces more rival hotels. To highlight the distinct revenue impacts from hotels belonging to
the same chain and those belonging to its rival chains, the ￿gure considers two situations: (1)
when all of its rival hotels belong to hotel chains and (2) when the hotel and all of its rival
hotels belong to the same chain. My estimation results imply that when a hotel competes
with one hotel (i.e., duopoly), its revenue is about 23 percent lower than its revenue under
the monopoly when its rival hotel belongs to di⁄erent chains. However, when its rival hotel
belongs to the same chain, its revenue decreases by 34 percent.21
6.1.3 Transition Function
Table 9 reports estimation results of the transition functions for state-level sales, market-
level establishments and population. Quarterly data are available for state sales while it is
not the case for the other two. Estimates of quarterly dummy variables verify that strong
seasonal demand in summer (second quarter) and weak seasonal demand in winter (fourth
quarter).
21Some might wonder why more intense competition due to the change from monopoly to duopoly does
not decrease the revenue of a hotel more than 50 percent. This conjecture is not necessarily true in my
setting that abstracts hotel chains￿within-market location decisions. The location of the second hotel is
generally di⁄erent from that of the ￿rst one and as a result the ￿rst hotel needs to compete with the second
hotel for only a fraction of its potential customers.
27Table 8: Revenue Function Estimates
(1) (2)
# of Hotels -0.047 -0.380
(0.023) (0.025)








Market Dummy No Yes
R-squared 0.998 0.998
Notes: N=15,482. Cluster standard erros are in parentheses. Each cluster is
market and time period speci￿c. Population, establishments and sales are in log.
Estimates and standard errors for market dummies, chain dummies and quarter
dummies are suppressed.






TOTAL NUMBER OF HOTELS
CASE1: RIVAL CHAINS OPEN HOTELS
Probability of Opening
Probability of Closing









TOTAL NUMBER OF HOTELS
CASE 1: ALL RIVAL HOTELS BELONG TO RIVAL CHAINS
CASE 2: ALL RIVAL HOTELS BELONG TO THE SAME CHAIN
Figure 4: Revenue Impacts of Having Rival Hotels
28Table 9: Transition Function Estimates
Dependent Variables
Sales Establishments Population
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.992 1.005 1.002
(0.020) (0.001) (0.002)











Notes: N=64 for sales and 1,020 for establishments and population. Standard
erros are in parentheses. All dependent variables are in log.
6.2 Second Stage
The second stage estimation provides the common variance parameter ￿￿ and a pair of oper-
atioon cost and sunk-entry cost (￿mi;emi) for each combination of market-chain. I describe
these estimates from two di⁄erent angles: its market average and its chain-speci￿c average.
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for the distribution of market average cost, (￿mi;emi).
In a hypothetical market whose cost parameters are equal to the sample average, a hotel
chain incurs $233 thousand for every quarter to operate a hotel and incur about $3.7 mil-
liion to open a new hotel. My estimates also indicate that the values of cost parameters
signi￿cantly vary across markets. Operation cost of the market at the third quartile is about
three times higher than that of the market at the ￿rst quartile. In contrast, sunk cost of the
market at the third quartile is about 40 percent higher than that of the market at the ￿rst
quartile.
Table 11 reports the chain-speci￿c average of cost parameter estimates, (￿mi;emi) and
the median of the number of rooms. These results clearly indicate that the cost structure of
each hotel chain is signi￿cantly di⁄erent. For example, the operation cost Inter-Continental
incurs is more than twice as much as that of Best Western. Capacity di⁄erence explains a
part of this di⁄erence. The median number of rooms of a hotel is eighty for Inter-Continental
29Table 10: Summary Statistics of the Market-Average Cost Parameter Estimates
Operating Sunk Entry
Cost (￿) Cost (e)
Mean 232.5 3714.0




Notes: N=40. All statistics are in thousand dollars.
Table 11: Average Cost Parameter Estimates: By Chain
Operating Sunk Entry Median Number
Cost (￿) Cost (e) of Rooms
Best Western 163.8 3,709.3 61
Cendant 114.3 3,973.7 85
Choice Hotels 114.0 3,839.9 60
Hilton 223.3 4,274.4 69
Inter-Continental 385.5 3,505.4 80
La Quinta 416.1 2,909.7 114
Notes: Operating cost and sunk entry cost are in thousand dollars. Operating
cost expresses the amount of cost a hotel incurs for its three-month operation.
while the corresponding number is sixty-one for Best Western. The di⁄erence not explained
by this capacity di⁄erence may re￿ ect possible quality di⁄erence between chains such as the
availability of free breakfast or business centers.
I next examine the relevance of these estimates by comparing them with cost data pro-
vided by industrial source. In particular, I look at the estimate for Best Western and La
Quinta since their company websites provide detailed information about their construction
guidelines. According to my calculation, construction cost of a new Best Western hotel is
about $3.4 million while my point estimate for its sunk entry cost is $3.7 million. For La
Quinta, its construction cost is $4.5 million while my point estimate is $2.9 million. See an
appendix for the details of how I calculate these numbers.
306.3 Third Stage: Cost Function Regression
Table 12 and Table 13 report regression estimates for operation cost function (￿mj) and
sunk entry cost function (emj) under various speci￿cations, respectively.22 To avoid omitted
variable problems, all the regressions here include the control variables used in the reduced
form regressions. The regression results indicate that the stringency of land use regulation
increases both operation cost and sunk-entry cost. The last column of Table 12 shows that
￿ve out of the seven parameter estimates of land use regulation indices on operation cost are
statistically signi￿ncat at least ten percent signi￿cant level. The signs of Political Pressure
and Open Space are all consistent with my hypothesis while other three (Density Restriction,
Exactions and Approval Delay) are not. However, the quantitative impacts of the ￿rst group
are much larger than those of the second group. These point estimates indicate that the
change in the ￿ve indices that statistically signi￿cant from the ￿rst quartile to the third
quartile increases the operation cost by 5.4 percent. The impact goes up to 12.1 percent if I
include all seven indices regardless of their statistical signi￿cance. As for sunk entry cost, the
last column of Table 13 shows that the estimate for Project Approval index is statistically
signiciant and its sign is consistent with my hypothesis. These estimates indicate that the
change in this index from the ￿rst quartile to the third quartile increases the sunk entry cost
by 20 percent. The impact goes up to 23 percent if I change the value of all the seven indices
regardless of their statistical signi￿cance.
One limitation of these estimates are possible simultaneity between market-speci￿c costs
and the stringency of land use regulation. When local governments determine the strin-
gency of regulation by looking at local business costs, these regression estimates are possibly
inconsistent. The standard solution of this problem is to ￿nd valid instruments that exoge-
nously shift the stringency of land use regulation. However, it is little hope to ￿nd such valid
instruments,23 let alone the fact that I have to ￿nd seven di⁄erent such instruments.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
This section shows the results of policy experiments, using the parameter estimates obtained
in the previous section. The goal of this exercise is to quantitatively evaluate the supply side
22I exclude the three chain-market combinations from the regression for sunk entry cost function since I
get zero as estimates. Excluding these three combinations from the operation cost function barely change
the estimates.
23McMillen and McDonald (1991a) and McMillen and McDonald (1991b) examine the possible selection
bias in land value function estimation when zoning decisions are endogenous. For instruments, they use an
indicator variable that tells whether a parcel is incorporated or not by municipals. This instrument is not
applicable in my study since my study focuses on the e⁄ects of land use regulation on a county as a whole
rather than each single parcel within a county.
31Table 12: OLS Estimates of Regulation Impacts on Operation Cost
Dep. Var. = Log of Operation Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Political Pressure 0.129 0.128 0.125 0.124 0.123 0.111 0.079
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Density Rest. -0.118 -0.237 -0.235 -0.257 -0.251 -0.249
(0.078) (0.095) (0.103) (0.104) (0.101) (0.096)
Exactions -0.359 -0.356 -0.383 -0.344 -0.404
(0.109) (0.114) (0.118) (0.112) (0.119)
Aprvl Delay -0.004 -0.022 -0.034 -0.042
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Zoning Aprvl -0.078 -0.054 -0.062
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042)




R-squared 0.780 0.790 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.810
Notes: N=234. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Population and area
are in log.
32Table 13: OLS Estimates of Regulation Impacts on the Distribution of Sunk
Entry Cost
Dep. Var. = Log of Sunk Entry Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Political Pressure 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 -0.001 -0.011
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Density Rest. 0.069 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.050 0.050
(0.069) (0.074) (0.074) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080)
Exactions -0.097 -0.096 -0.095 -0.019 -0.038
(0.113) (0.114) (0.121) (0.124) (0.124)
Aprvl Delay -0.002 -0.002 -0.025 -0.028
(0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Zoning Aprvl 0.002 0.048 0.046
(0.051) (0.057) (0.057)




R-squared 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.220 0.220
Notes: N=237. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
33Table 14: Summary Statistics of the Sample Markets
Grayson County
Population (in thousand) 116.8
Area (in sq mi) 933.5
# of Establishments (in thousand) 2.6
Employments (in thousand) 36.6
MSA Dummy 1.0
Airport Dummy 0.0
Interstate Highway Dummy 0.0
Notes: As of the ￿rst quarter of 2005.
e⁄ect of regulation change on entry decisions of hotel chains and the change in the intensity
of competition. To isolate this particular e⁄ect, I construct an imaginary environment where
land use regulation a⁄ects only cost but not demand.
7.1 Environments
My counterfactual experiments consider Grayson County in which two hotel chains (Best
Western and Cendant) consider their entry decisions every period. In 2005, the population
of this market is equal to the sample median. Table 14 shows the basic information of this
market. Ideal experiments might be the ones that allow all seven heterogeneous hotel chains
to make entry decisions in each of forty markets considered in the previous chapter. However,
the limitation of computational resources prevents this approach. For that reason, the results
of counterfactual experiments shown here should be considered as a mean that helps us
understand what the structural estimates convey rather than the predicted market structure
under hypothetical policies in these local markets. I simulate the entry-exit decisions of
these two hotel chains under three di⁄erent policies: Q1, Q2 and Q3. Each policy is di⁄erent
in terms of the value of land use regulation indices. Under Q1, the value of all land use
regulation indices are set to be equal to the sample ￿rst quartile. Land use regulation
indices under Q2 and Q3 are also constructed in the same way.
347.2 Procedure
I ￿rst calculate the operation costs and the sunk entry costs of these two chains under each
policy by using the OLS estimates in the last column of Table 12 and Table 13.24 I next
numerically solve the Bellman equation under a particular set of structural parameters to
obtain the approximated value function and the resulting policy functions. Using these equi-
librium policy functions, I simulate the model. I employ the algorithm originally suggested
by Pakes and McGuire (1994) and extended by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (forthcoming)
to games of incomplete information. In all the experiments, I ￿x all market-speci￿c values
such as population to their value in the ￿rst quarter of 2005 to reduce the state space. Hence
the state space consists of the number of hotels belonging to one￿ s chain, the number of hotels
belonging to the rival chain and which quarter the current period is. The number of possible
states is 256. All the experiments converge after around 600 iterations.
7.3 Simulation Results
Table 15 reports the results of the counterfactual experiments. All variables except producer
surplus are based on the sample average of the simulated periods while the producer surplus
comes from the value of the value function under the initial state.25 The simulation results
support the empirical relevance of my hypothesis that stringent regulation leads to fewer
entries. Under the most lenient policy (Q1), the average number of hotels in the small
market is 2.2. As the policy becomes more stringent, this number decreases to 2.0 (Q2) and
1.6 (Q3). Assuming the number of rooms of each hotel is equal to the chain-average, these
results imply that imposing stringent regulation increases the revenue per room by three
percent (Q1 ! Q2) and twelve percent (Q1 ! Q3) regardless of chains. These increases
are suggestive of higher prices in the market imposing more stringent regulation. Despite of
higher market power, hotel chains do not necessarily make more pro￿ts. According to the
results, the change from the most lenient policy (Q1) to the modest one (Q2) decreases the
producer surplus by $1.5 million while the change to the most stringent one (Q3) decreases
it by $6.4 million, respectively.
24All point estimates are used regardless of their statistical signi￿cance.
25Calculating consumer surplus is not possible in this model since the model abstracts the demand side
by using the revenue function.
35Table 15: Counterfactual Experiments
Land Use Regulation
Q1 Q2 Q3
Operation Costs (in thousand dollars)
Best Western 91.76 98.70 102.89
Cendant 75.67 81.39 84.84
Sunk Entry Costs (in thousand dollars)
Best Western 4,454.3 4,711.8 5,592.4
Cendant 3,831.4 3,963.9 4,704.7
# of Hotels
Total 2.22 2.04 1.61
Best Western 1.05 1.09 .75
Cendant 1.17 .95 .86
Daily Revenue per Room (in dollars)
Best Western 28.55 29.48 31.94
Cendant 14.77 15.26 16.55
Producer Surplus (in million dollars) 14.15 12.66 7.76
Best Western 5.95 5.26 3.13
Cendant 8.20 7.39 4.63
Notes: Daily revenue per room is obtained by dividing quarter revenue by ninety-
two days.
368 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of land use regulation as a barrier to entry in the case of the
midscale Texas lodging industry. I argue that stringent land use regulation lessens local
competition by increasing the costs of hotels. This lessened competition generates a distor-
tion by providing hotels that enter with additional market power. The structural estimates
obtained in this paper are informative to assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis.
According to my estimates, the change in the stringency of land use regulation from the
sample ￿rst quartile level to the sample third quartile level increases the level of the market-
speci￿c operating cost by 5.4 percent and that of sunk-entry cost by 24 percent, respectively.
As a result, the revenue-per-room, a proxy for the price, increases by 12 percent.
This paper is among the ￿rst to empirically examine the anticompetitive e⁄ect of land
use regulation on local business markets. Although people in the lodging business and legal
professions have noticed it, there has been no formal analysis that quanti￿es this e⁄ect. This
paper also contributes an introduction of structural estimation to the literature. Although
reduced form estimates might be more ￿ exible from restrictive assumptions, they do not
tell whether these results come through the supply side or the demand side. The structural
estimation employed in this paper has the advantage of separately identifying these two
e⁄ects.
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39A Appendix A: Derivation of the Choice Probability
(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
This appendix derives the choice probabilities when a hotel chain￿ s deccision problem is
written as
max(￿(1;s) + ￿1; ￿(0;s); ￿(￿1;s) + ￿2).
While this model is quite similar to the standard multinomial logit model, the lack of stochas-
tic shock in a particular choice (i.e., a = 0) brings di⁄erent forms of the choice probabilities.
The derivation is quite similar to that of the standard multinomial logit model shown in, for
example, Train (2003). For notational purpose, I ￿rst rewrite this problem as
max(g1 + ￿1; g0; ￿i2)
where
g1 = ￿(1;s) ￿ ￿(￿1;s)
g0 = ￿(0;s) ￿ ￿(￿1;s):
The probability hotel chains choose no change is
Pr(a = 0) = Pr(g0 > ￿2 and g0 > g1 + ￿1)
















The probability that hotel chains choose closing a hotel is




























40Denoting t = e￿￿2, I have d￿2 = ￿ dt
e￿￿2 = ￿dt
t .


































Finally, the probability that hotel chains choose opening a new hotel (i.e., a = 1) is
Pr(a = 1) = 1 ￿ Pr(a = ￿1) ￿ Pr(a = 0)
= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ Pr(a = 0))
1
eg1 + 1
￿ Pr(a = 0)








Pr(a = ￿1) = (1 ￿ exp(￿e￿g0 (1 + eg1))) ￿ 1
eg1+1
Pr(a = 0) = exp(￿e￿g0 (1 + eg1))






Pr(a = ￿1) = (1 ￿ U (s)) ￿ 1
1+exp(￿(1;s)￿￿(￿1;s))



















Pr(a = ￿1) = 0
Pr(a = 0) = exp
￿
￿e￿(1;s)￿￿(0;s)￿








Pr(a = ￿1) = 1 ￿ exp
￿
￿e￿(￿(0;s)￿￿(￿1;s))￿
Pr(a = 0) = exp
￿
￿e￿(￿(0;s)￿￿(￿1;s))￿
Pr(a = 1) = 0:
42B Appendix B: Recovering the Construction Cost of a
Midscale Chain Hotel (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
This appendix describes the procedure I follow to calculate the construction cost of a midscale
chain hotel in Texas from industry source. I limit my focus on Best Western and La Quinta
since their websites provide detailed information (but not construction cost) about their
prototype models. Calculation consists of three steps. I ￿rst estimate the total building
square footage of their prototype hotels. I next estimate the square foot cost for hotel
construction in Texas. Finally, I obtain a construction cost estimate from the product of
these two numbers.
My calculation for the total building square footage of a Best Western hotel and La
Quinta hotel relies on the brochures they put on their websites. Among several prototypes
proposed by these two chains, I look at Classic Mid-Scale Prototype for Best Western26 and
Design B Prototype for La Quinta27.
Best Western￿ s ￿ oor plan shows the amount of area allocated to each function of a hotel
(e.g, guest rooms and administrative). Although I am able to obtain the total building square
footage of this prototype by summing up these numbers, I do not use this sum directly since
this prototype seems to re￿ ect higher standards imposed to newly constructed hotels only
and hotels in my sample do not necessarily follow this higher standards. First, its prototype
has more rooms than those in my sample (80 rooms vs 60 rooms). Second, this prototype
re￿ ects its minimum room size requirement imposed to only new hotels (312 square foot)
than that imposed to existing hotels (200 square foot). Considering these facts, I consider
a hotel that has 60 guest rooms of 280 square foot. Assuming the amount of areas used
for other functions are not di⁄erent between this prototype and existing hotels, I conclude
that a total building square footage of a Best Western hotel during my sample period is
29,600 foot. Table 16 provides a breakdown of this calculation. For La Quinta, I use the
total building square footage shown in the brochure since the capacity di⁄erence between
this prototype and the sample median is relatively small (114 rooms vs 105 rooms) and the
brochure does not provide the breakdown of this total building square footage anyway. As a
result, I use 55,041 square foot for the total building square footage for a La Quinta hotel.I
next calculate the square foot construction cost for a motel. RS-Means provides a square
foot construction cost for various types of commercial buildings. Among them, I employ
the one for a two to three story motel. To re￿ ect locational di⁄erence of construction costs,
I also employ Location Factors, a price index provided by RS-Means. Finally, I normalize
26http://www.bestwesterndevelopers.com/resources/classic/AS1.00.pdf
27http://www.lq.com/lq/about/franchise/PrototypeGuide-B.pdf
43Table 16: Total Building Square Footage for a Best Western hotel
Functions Area (Sq. Foot)
Sixty Guest Rooms 16,800
Guest Room Support Corridors, Stairs, Guest Laundry 4,741
Administrative O¢ ces 545
Public Areas Lobby, Business Center, Fitness Center 4,415
Back of House Areas Employee Lounge, Linen, Storage 3,099
Total 29,600
Notes: The average guest rooms size is assumed to be 280 squares foot.
this square foot cost to 2000 dollars by employing Turner Building Cost Index provided by
Turner Construction. Following these steps, I obtain 81.3 dollar for square foot cost.28
Finally, I multiply the obtained square foot cost with the total building square footage.
As a result, I obtain $2,407 thousand dollars (= 81:3 ￿ 29;600) as an estimate for the total
construction cost of a Best Western hotel and $4,505 thousand dollars for that of a La Quinta
hotel.
28The breakdown of this calculation is 147.75 dollar as a square footage construction cost, .790 as a
location factor and .697 as Turner Building Cost Index. Rouding brings a slight di⁄erence between the
product of these three numbers and the number shown in the text.
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